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Abstract
We use UK data to show that firms that sponsor a defined-benefit pension plan
are less likely to be targeted in an acquisition and, conditional on an attempted
takeover, they are less likely to be acquired. Since UK pension plans cannot
hold shares of the sponsoring company, our explanation is that the uncertainty
in the value of pension liabilities is a source of risk for acquirers of the firm’s
shares, which works as a takeover deterrent. In support of this explanation we
find that these same firms are more likely to use cash when acquiring other
firms, and that the announcement of a cash acquisition is associated with
positive cumulative abnormal returns.
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1 Introduction
There has recently been an increased interest in corporate sponsored pension plans
and how their existence affects firms’ real (investment) and financial decisions. Our
paper contributes to this literature by showing that defined-benefit (DB) pension lia-
bilities discourage potential bidders from acquiring the sponsoring companies. More
precisely we use United Kingdom (UK) data to show that firms that sponsor DB
pension plans are less likely to be targeted in an acquisition, particularly when they
have a large pension deficit relative to the market value of their equity. Moreover,
conditional on an attempted acquisition, completion is less likely if the target firms
sponsor a DB pension plan.
The explanation that we propose is that the presence of DB pension plans, par-
ticularly those with a large deficit, represents a source of risk for potential acquirers,
which deters them from bidding for such firms.1 The deficit in DB pension plans
(that is the difference between pension liabilities and pension assets) is a liability
for the sponsoring company. The size of this deficit is difficult to determine since
its value depends on the risk of the pension plan liabilities, pension plan members’
longevity, employee mobility, among others. Naturally, uncertainty with respect to
the value of the pension deficit translates into uncertainty with respect to the value
of the sponsoring firm’s equity. Furthermore, the management of the companies that
sponsor such plans have more information on the assumptions used and on the value
of the deficit than outsiders do. This is why DB pension plans may act as a takeover
deterrent: potential acquirers of the company shares may be worried that they are
buying a lemon. Hence, they may need to invest a lot in due diligence before doing
1The pension plans that we study are not allowed to own shares of the sponsoring company, or
any other assets that are related to it (e.g. the pension plan cannot own property that is leased out
to the sponsoring company). Furthermore, we are not arguing that firms adopt DB pension plans
for the explicit purpose of fending off hostile takeovers. DB pension plans were set up decades ago
mainly as a form of labor compensation to provide employees with income after retirement. What
we show is that an unintended consequence of DB pension plans is that firms that have them are
less likely to be taken over.
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a deal and, if they are not willing to do so, adverse selection in the market for equity
may lead to a market breakdown.
In an M&A setting in which asymmetric information exists, the medium of ex-
change can play an important role, and facilitate the transaction. The model of
Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) predicts that acquiring firms subject to in-
formation asymmetries should use cash as the means of payment when acquiring
other firms. This is because target firms will be reluctant to accept the shares of the
acquirer in exchange for their own shares.2 If DB pension plans increase asymmetric
information problems, sponsoring firms should be more likely to use cash as a means
of payment in acquisitions. Furthermore, the announcement of a cash acquisition
would be a positive signal, and be reflected on positive announcement returns. We
test these predictions on our data and find that indeed firms with DB pension plans
(particularly when they have large deficits) are more likely to use cash when they
acquire other companies, and that the announcement of a cash acquisition has pos-
itive abnormal returns. These announcement effects provide strong support for our
explanation that information asymmetries related to company sponsored DB pension
plans affect firms decisions.
It is important to note that all our results are robust to controlling for a measure
of firm leverage, that treats the pension deficit as debt for the sponsoring company.
Hence, they are not due to debt overhang and the fact that companies that sponsor
DB pension plans tend to be more highly levered (Shivdasani and Stefanescu, 2009).
We also show that our results hold when we control for measures of asymmetric in-
formation that may arise from sources other than the pension plan. Finally, and to
further test the asymmetric information hypothesis we analyze one other economic
settings in which it may have an impact, namely the decision to raise equity through
2For evidence on the relation between means of payment and information asymmetries see Travlos
(1987), Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) and Franks, Harris and Titman (1991), and the
more recent evidence provided by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), Officer (2007), and
Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo (2008).
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Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs). If our hypothesis is correct then firms that spon-
sor a DB pension plan should be less likely to raise equity.3 Interestingly, we find
that firms that sponsor a DB pension plan with a large pension deficit relative to the
market value of their equity are also less likely to issue equity.
The data that we use for our study is from the UK. There are three main reasons
why we have used this data. First, unlike in many other countries, in the UK pension
plans are prevented from investing in the shares of the sponsoring company. Second,
there is large variation with respect to the size and deficit of company sponsored
DB pension plans. About two-thirds of the companies in our sample sponsor DB
pension plans, and within the latter group there is significant variation in the value
of the pension deficit relative to the market value of the firms’ equity, ranging from
49 percent to −13 percent. Third, accounting rules require firms to disclose the
market value of the pension assets and other pension data in the footnotes to the
companies’ annual reports. We hand-collected this data and combined it with firm-
level information from Worldscope, and SEOs and M&A activity data from SDC
Platinum, and share price data from Datastream.
In addition to the M&A and SEOs literature, our paper contributes to a growing
literature on the interdependence between various aspects of corporate financial pol-
icy and corporate pension plans. For instance, Rauh (2006b) shows that mandatory
pension contributions can affect the level of corporate investment due to financial con-
straints; the price impact of mandatory pension contributions depends on whether
the firm is under- or overinvesting (Franzoni, 2009); while Shivdasani and Stefanescu
(2009) show that firms with DB pension plans are more highly levered.4
3Diekerns (1991) has shown that the presence of asymmetric information (proxied by the standard
deviation of abnormal returns) makes it more difficult for firms to raise outside equity. Bayless and
Chaplinsky (1994) have shown that there are good and bad times to issue equity, depending on the
companies recent performance, which is used as a proxy for the severity of asymmetric information.
4Other papers that study company sponsored pension plans are Treynor (1977), Black (1980),
and Tepper (1981) who focus on the optimal asset allocation within pension plans. More recent
papers focus on the decision to terminate a pension plan (Petersen, 1992), on the impact of pension
liabilities on debt ratings (Carroll and Niehaus, 1998), on the relation between cash-flow volatility
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There is an ongoing debate on whether markets are able to correctly price firms
with DB pension plans. On the one hand, Coronado and Sharpe (2003) and Franzoni
and Marin (2006) argue that the market price of the companies shares does not fully
reflect the potential liabilities associated with underfunded pension plans. On the
other hand, Jin, Merton and Bodie (2006) find that investors recognize pension assets
and liabilities and incorporate them in determining the cost of equity capital for the
sponsoring firms. Our results suggest that investors are concerned about the value of
the liabilities associated with company sponsored pension plans. This is because the
deficit in the pension plans is difficult to determine, company insiders have better
information about these deficits than the market, and they may also manipulate the
assumptions used for the valuation of pension assets and liabilities (Bergstresser,
Desai, and Rauh, 2006).
In a recent paper Rauh (2006a) finds in US data that employee ownership of
the stock of the sponsoring firm via a defined-contribution pension plan reduces the
probability of a takeover. Since employees may be against a takeover (maybe because
generous pension benefits are more likely to be terminated following hostile takeovers
as shown by Pontiff, Shleifer and Weisbach, 1990), the mechanism at work in the US
is an agency one: the employees and the management of the sponsoring company use
shares owned by the pension plan to prevent a takeover. The economic mechanism at
work in the UK is very different from this, and as we show it is based on asymmetric
information.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We start with an example
to motivate our use of DB pension plans as a source of information asymmetries,
and their implications for the market for corporate control. Section 2 then describes
the data that we use for our study, and it also includes a description of the methods
used to determine the pension deficit. Our results that show how the presence of a
DB pension plan acts as a takeover deterrent are presented and discussed in Section
and pension liabilities (Petersen, 1994), and also on how pension plan assets are invested (Frank,
2002, and Rauh, 2009).
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3. This section also presents evidence on the means of payment and announcement
effects. Further tests are included in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 An Illustrative Example
The idea that we wish to investigate in this paper is simple but, we believe, important.
The value of the equity of a firm that sponsors a DB pension plan depends on the
value of its corporate pension deficit (pension liabilities net of pension assets) relative
to its market capitalization. Because of the complexity in evaluating the assets and
liabilities in a pension plan, corporate insiders (managers and large shareholders)
may have more information than the market about the true value of the pension
deficit. As a consequence, investors may be reluctant to buy the firm’s shares, so
that the sponsoring of a DB pension plan may act as a takeover deterrent.
As an example of the relevance of corporate sponsored DB pension plans for M&A
activity we discuss recent events related to British Airways, which is one of the firms
in our sample. In July 2008, British Airways (BA) and Iberia of Spain announced
that they were planning to merge their operations, creating a £3.8 billion company
that would benefit from Iberia’s presence in Latin America and BA’s market share in
North America and Asia. Industry analysts believed the two companies to be a good
“strategic fit,” since there would be considerable cost savings generated by bringing
their operations together.
However, in the months following the announcement of the all-share merger, dis-
cussions stalled because of concerns about the size of BA’s pension deficit and its
implications for valuation. In March 2008, BA’s pension deficit was £437 million,
while BA’s market capitalization had declined to £2 billion pounds. Later that year,
BA admitted that on September 18 the trustees of the pension plan had calculated
the deficit to be equal to £1.74 billion. Industry experts believed that the deficit
might be even larger.
The size of the BA pension scheme deficit, and the large fluctuations in its value
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were a concern to Iberia, which by December 2008, after months of struggling to
understand it, had hired Mercer, a pension consulting firm, to review BA’s pension
schemes. Fernando Conte, Iberia Chairman, said that unless Iberia could protect
itself from the BA scheme, it would be “bonkers” to enter into a transaction where
it was “on the hook” for it (The Daily Telegraph, 28 December 2008).
By February 2009 signs of difficulty in reaching a deal were apparent. Nick van
den Brull, an analyst with BNP Paribas, said “I don’t see anything happening before
the pension deficit is known. Directors [at Iberia] would wish to know the maximum
extent of the liabilities before proceeding.” (The New York Times, 8 February 2009).
It was this uncertainty, and the worry that it may be buying a lemon, that led Iberia,
three months later, to propose that the merger contains a post-deal adjustment to
account for BA’s pension deficit. More precisely, Iberia proposed an all-share merger
ratio that would be adjusted if the deficit widens because of such things as increased
longevity assumptions. However, BA fiercely resisted demands for such adjustment
mechanism, believing it would be impossible to sell such an open-ended deal to its
shareholders (The Daily Telegraph, 22 May 2009).
At the same time, British Airways’ Chairman Martin Broughton was blaming the
firm’s spiralling pension scheme deficit on the processes employed by actuaries and
accountants. “It’s little wonder that the Spanish have such difficulty understanding
[our pensions]. It’s clearly time that the actuarial and the accounting world got
together and recognized the folly of having mechanical processes in place that produce
such divergent results, neither of which really seem in touch with reality.” At the
same time he called for an overhaul of the system to help BA shareholders and Iberia
understand the situation (Pensions Week, 25 June 2009).
One month later BA acknowledged that due to the crisis it needed to increase
liquidity, but at the same time its Chairman Martin Broughton ruled out an equity
issue, arguing that it was not a good time for the firm to carry it out. This happened
amid questions about the sustainability of the firm’s business model, geared towards
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premium travelers, and the firm’s pension deficit (Dow Jones Market Watch, 14 July
2009).
On November 12, after many months of discussions, BA and Iberia announced
that they had reached a preliminary agreement for a merger expected to be completed
in late 2010. Under its terms Iberia would take a 45% stake and BA a 55% stake.
However, Iberia said it can pull out if BA fails to resolve its pension deficit problem
(BBC news, 12 November 2009).
The BA example illustrates how concerns about pension liabilities can affect M&A
activity. Naturally, asymmetric information can be reduced by the disclosure of
information, which happened during the BA negotiations. However, bidders may
still be worried about selective disclosure of information by the target. The medium
of exchange could also have played a role in facilitating the transaction, but the
large size of the deal meant that the use of cash was not an alternative. Although
the events described suggest that there is such an effect for BA, the purpose of this
paper is to find out how relevant such considerations are for a wider sample of firms.
For that reason we have collected data for a large sample of UK firms.
2 The Data
In order to investigate whether company sponsored DB pension plans act as a
takeover deterrent we use UK data on the FTSE 350 companies. FTSE 350 is an
index that includes the largest 350 companies (by market capitalization) listed on
the London Stock Exchange. To avoid survivorship bias, we select the FTSE 350
companies in 2002, the first year in our sample, as the universe of companies in
our study, and we track them over time. We chose the FTSE 350 companies since
company sponsored DB pension plans are more significant for larger firms. Among
smaller companies, company sponsored DB pension plans tend to be less prevalent,
and when they do exist they tend to cover a very limited number of employees. For
this set of companies we collected data on firm and pension plan variables, and M&A
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activity for the 2002-2008 period.
We start our sample in the year 2002 since this is the first year in which pension
data reported under the Financial Reporting Standards 17 (FRS 17) accounting
rules has become widely available. Prior to this year the reported information on
UK company sponsored pension plans is very scarce. Many companies report solely
the contributions that they have made into the pension plan during the fiscal year.
FRS 17, which replaced SSAP 24, was introduced in 2000 but it only had to be
applied in full after accounting periods ending on or after June 2003. Nonetheless,
many companies already report such information in 2002, so that we have decided to
start our sample in this year. We will discuss the rules in FRS 17 regarding pension
valuation below. Our data comes from four different sources, which we now describe
in detail.
2.1 Firm Data
For each of the firms in our sample we collect annual data, from 2002 to 2008, from
Worldscope. On the assets’ side, we use the value of book assets, cash and other
marketable securities and the value of property, plant and equipment (PPE). On the
liabilities’ side, we focus on the book value of short and long term debt, and on the
book value of equity. From the income statement we obtain data on the value of the
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). In addition to these accounting variables,
we obtain, for each firm, data on its market capitalization at the end of the fiscal
year.
We use this data to construct several variables that we use in the regression
analysis. Profitability, or return on assets, is EBIT during the fiscal year divided by
the beginning of period book value of the assets. Firm size is the logarithm of the
value of total assets; the Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of equity
over the book value of equity; Asset Tangibility is equal to the value of PPE over
the value of the assets; Cash holdings is cash divided by total assets; and Financial
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leverage is equal to the value of short plus long term debt, divided by total assets.
When variables are reported in US dollars (or Euros) we use end of month/fiscal year
exchange rates to convert them into pounds. We winsorize all firm variables at the
1% level to take care of potential outliers.
In addition to the previously described variables we obtain for each firm/year a
measure of return volatility which is the standard deviation of the share return over
the previous year, and a measure of closely held shares which is the proportion of
shares that are held by corporate insiders (officers, directors, and their immediate
families) and by individuals who own more than five percent of the firm shares.
2.2 Pension Data
We have hand-collected pension data from the footnotes of the annual reports. In the
UK the accounting rules for company sponsored defined pensions are set by FRS 17.
Pension liabilities are projected for the future based on inflation, expected pension
and salary growth, employee mobility, and longevity assumptions. Such liabilities
are then discounted at the yield on an AA corporate bond. The pension deficit is
calculated as the difference between the market value of the assets and the present
value of the liabilities.
Accounting standards under FRS 17 are better than under its predecessor, since
assets are valued at market values and a specific discount rate has to be used for the
valuation of pension liabilities. Therefore, the assumed expected rate of return on
assets does not play any role in the determining the pension deficit, and unlike in the
US, firms in the UK do not have flexibility with respect to the choice of the discount
rate (see Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh, 2006). This is why we do not focus on these
assumptions in our study. However, as our discussion of the British Airways example
illustrated, even under FRS 17 there is considerable uncertainty with respect to what
the actual deficit is, and to what the reported values really mean.
Although FRS 17 specifies the discount rate to be used in the valuation of pension
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liabilities, and this information is disclosed in the footnotes to the annual reports,
the assumptions made regarding employee mobility and longevity were not always
made explicit during the period of analysis. We argue that the complexity behind
the valuation of pension liabilities (and the large impact that alternative assumptions
have on the value of pension deficits) is a likely source of uncertainty and risk in the
valuation of firms that sponsor DB pension plans.5
The deficit in a DB pension plan depends on the ages of the members of the
pension plan, on whether they are active or deferred members, on the assumptions
made regarding employee mobility and life expectancy. For example, there are a
variety of assumptions that firms and their actuaries use to model mortality. In the
Appendix, we illustrate the quantitative impact of differences in these assumptions
on the value of DB pension liabilities.
2.3 M&A Activity Data
We collect data on M&A activity from SDC platinum. We select all the events in
which firms in our sample were the targets in M&A activity, and on events in which
they were the acquirers. We use the former to investigate if the presence of DB
pension liabilities affects the likelihood that the firm is the target of a takeover at-
tempt, and the likelihood that the deal is completed. We use the latter to investigate
whether target firms are reluctant to accept stock as a means of payment from a firm
that sponsors a DB pension plan with a large pension deficit. Both of these seemed
to be a concern in the merger discussions between Iberia and British Airways that
we have previously described.
More precisely, we collect information on whether the firms in our sample were, in
each year, the target in a completed, withdrawn or rumored takeover deal. From this
data, we create two dummies. One for the existence of some kind of M&A activity,
5In the last years of our sample, some firms disclose longevity assumptions in the footnotes to
the annual report. We have collected this data, but due to its limited availability we have decided
not to use it in our main empirical analysis.
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and another for whether the deal was completed. Since the fiscal year end differs
across firms, the balance sheet information and pension data for year t is matched
with information on the takeover activity that take place in the 12 months that follow
the fiscal year end.
For the acquisitions carried out by the firms in our sample, we collect data on
the means of payment used in these acquisitions. For each firm/year we compute the
value-weighted proportion of the cash used in the acquisitions that were announced
in the 12 months following the fiscal year end.
2.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables that we have constructed. Our
sample has 1,463 observations, that correspond to 319 different firms. We have lost
31 firms out of the initial 350 because they do not have balance sheet information in
Worldscope. The vast majority of these are investment funds. We use all 319 firms
in the main regression analysis but we will also report regression results in which we
exclude financial companies. Data is not available for all years because in the first
couple of years of our sample some of the firms do not report pension information
under FRS 17. Moreover, some of the companies in our sample were acquired during
the period of analysis, so that we do not have information on them post-acquisition.
Therefore, we use an unbalanced panel for our analysis.
Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics for firm variables. On average,
firms in our sample have a return on assets equal to 8%, a market-to-book value of
equity equal to 1.38, and leverage equal to 24%. The latter value increases to 27%
when we include the deficit in the pension plan to calculate total leverage. For all
of these variables there is considerable cross-sectional heterogeneity, as can be seen
from the standard deviation, minimum and maximum values reported in the table.
Roughly two-thirds of the firm-year observations that we have correspond to firms
that sponsor a DB pension plan.
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Panel B shows summary statistics for the pension deficit relative to the market
value of the equity and relative to the market value of total assets (obtained by adding
market capitalization and book debt) of the sponsoring company. Pension deficits
are on average 4 percent of the company’s assets, but there is significant variation
across firms, with some firms having a surplus, while others have a deficit as high as
one quarter of firm assets. Naturally, the variation is larger when we consider the
value of the pension deficit as a fraction of the market capitalization of the sponsoring
company, with values as high as 50%. There are also companies that have a surplus
in the pension plan that they sponsor, with a maximum value of 13% of their market
capitalization.6
The last panel of Table 1, Panel C, reports summary statistics for the variables
related to M&A activity. There has been a takeover attempt in 9.17% of the firm/year
observations in our sample, which corresponds to 134 attempts, and the takeover was
completed for roughly one third of these attempts. In terms of acquisitions by the
FTSE 350 companies in our sample, there were 499 firm/years for which at least one
acquisition took place. Therefore, and as one would expect given that we study large
companies, the companies in our sample are more likely to acquire others than to be
the target in a takeover attempt. Interestingly, there is considerable variability in
the means of payment used in these acquisitions. The weighted average proportion
of cash used was 44%, and the standard deviation is an order of magnitude similar.
In Panel A of Table 2 we compare the companies that sponsor a DB pension plan
to those that do not sponsor such a plan. The two sub-samples differ along many
dimensions. Firms that sponsor a DB pension plan are on average larger, as measured
by the logarithm of the total value of the assets. Furthermore, firms that sponsor
are more profitable and more highly levered, both in terms of financial leverage and
total leverage (inclusive of pension deficit). Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2009) also
show, for a sample of US firms, that leverage ratios (inclusive of the pension deficit)
6In the UK companies are not allowed to take out the assets of the pension plans that have a
surplus, although they could reduce their contributions.
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are higher for firms that sponsor a pension plan than for those that do not do so.
Not only firms that sponsor a DB pension plan are more highly levered, they also
have lower cash holdings.
The last rows of Panel A of Table 2 show the results for univariate tests for the
M&A variables. The (unconditional) probability that a firm that sponsors a DB
pension plan is the target of a takeover attempt is not statistically different from
the probability for a firm that does not sponsor a DB pension plan. However, the
likelihood that a firm in our sample is taken over is significantly lower for firms that
sponsor a DB pension plan: 2.61% compared to 5.5% for firms that do not sponsor
a pension plan.
In Panel B of Table 2 we present similar univariate tests, but excluding financial
companies from our sample. Some firm variables such as leverage are difficult to
interpret for financial companies. Interestingly, we find that non-financial firms which
sponsor a DB pension plan are less likely to be the target in a takeover attempt and
they are less likely to be taken over. The magnitude of the differences is economically
meaningful. The results in Table 2, although interesting, are univariate and it is
important to control for firm characteristics such as size, profitability, and leverage,
when studying the effects of the sponsoring of pension plans on M&A activity. In
order to do so we turn our attention to multivariate regressions.
3 M&A Activity
3.1 Probability of a Takeover
We use regression analysis to study the effects of the sponsoring of DB pension plans
on M&A activity. The regressions that we estimate are:
Ti,t+1 =


0 if α + βXit + γ (DB Dummy)it + δ (Pension Deficit)it + εit ≤ 0
1 if α + βXit + γ (DB Dummy)it + δ (Pension Deficit)it + εit > 0
(1)
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where Ti,t+1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a rumor that
the company that sponsors the pension plan is the target of takeover activity and
zero otherwise, Xit is a vector of control variables, and εi,t+1 is the residual which is
assumed to be N(0, 1). In these regressions the timing of the variables is such that
t refers to variables measured at the fiscal year end, and t + 1 refers to the decision
to engage in M&A activity in the twelve calendar months following the fiscal year
end. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we report the estimated
coefficients as the marginal effect on the dependent variable due to changes in the
regressors.
We also estimate similar regressions to the above in which the dependent variable
is the dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company is successfully
acquired, and zero otherwise (both unconditionally and conditional on a takeover
being attempted).
We investigate the effects of two pension plan variables on the decision to engage
in M&A activity, namely of DB Dummyit which is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one if firm i sponsors a DB pension plan in year t and zero otherwise,
and of Pension Deficit it which is the value of the pension deficit scaled by the firm’s
market capitalization. The first variable captures the difference between firms with
and without DB pension plans. However, some firms with DB pension plans have
very small plans and others run a surplus. Therefore, we also include in our regression
the second variable (Pension Deficit it), which allows for a differential effect for those
companies that sponsor plans whose deficit is large relative to market capitalization.
Although there may be considerable uncertainty with respect to the extent to which
this reported deficit reflects the firm liability associated with the pension plan, such
reported deficit can be a signal of the extent to which the sponsoring of the pension
plan is a concern for the investors in the firm shares.
The control variables in this main specification include firm size, firm profitability
(measured by ROA), cash holdings, and total leverage. It is important to remember
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that our measure of total leverage includes the value of the pension deficit, i.e. the
pension deficit is treated as debt of the sponsoring firm and added to the firm financial
leverage to obtain total leverage. Thus, the pension deficit variable in specification
(1) captures the effects of pension liabilities on M&A activity, beyond the effect that
such liabilities have on the total leverage of the firm. We include year and industry
fixed effects in all the regressions (but their coefficients are not reported). In the
robustness section below, we will control for further variables.
The results are reported in Table 3. Below the estimated coefficients we report
standard errors which are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
Panel A reports the estimation results for the full sample, whereas Panel B reports
the estimation results when we exclude financial firms from the sample.
The first two columns of Panel A show that firms that sponsor a DB pension
plan with a large deficit relative to their market capitalization are less likely to be
the target in a takeover attempt. Furthermore, the results in Column 3 show that
companies that sponsor a DB pension plan are less likely to be acquired. The effect
is economically significant: the probability of a completed takeover drops by roughly
2% for firms that sponsor DB pension plans. This effect is economically very large
as the average probability of completed takeover is 3.6%, as shown in Table 1.
This effect arises mainly from those companies for which the pension plan that
they sponsor has a large deficit relative to the market capitalization (Column 4).
It is important to note that this is result is not simply due to the companies that
sponsor pension plans with a larger deficit having higher leverage, since we control
for a leverage measure (Total leverage) that treats the pension deficit as leverage.
The results are also significant when we condition the sample on a takeover at-
tempt. More precisely, conditional on being the target of takeover attempt, firms
that sponsor a DB pension plan are less likely to be acquired (roughly one third less
likely, Column 5 of Table 3), and particularly so if the pension deficit is large relative
to their market capitalization (column 6).
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We also estimate regressions similar to those in Panel A of Table 3, but excluding
financial firms from the sample. The results are reported in Panel B. As can be seen
from this panel the effects of the sponsoring of DB pension plan on M&A activity
are stronger for this subsample of firms. The probability of being the target of a
takeover attempt is 5.6% lower for firms that sponsor a DB pension plan, as can be
seen from column 1. Furthermore, the probability of being the target of a completed
deal is 4.3% lower for firms that sponsor a DB pension plan (column 3). Finally, the
probability that the takeover is completed, conditional on being attempted, is 45%
lower for firms that sponsor a DB pension plan.
The results in Table 3 show that the sponsoring of a DB pension plan works as
a takeover deterrent. The effects are statistically and economically very meaningful.
Our proposed explanation is that acquiring firms are worried they may be buying a
lemon due to the presence of company sponsored DB pension liabilities. We provide
evidence in support of this explanation in the following analysis.
3.2 Means of Payment in M&A Activity: Acquiring Firms
If due to the presence of company sponsored DB pension plans, buyers of the firm
shares are worried that they may be buying a lemon, when the acquiring firm sponsors
such plan, then target shareholders may be reluctant to accept the acquiring firm’s
shares as a means of payment. With this in mind we study the choice of the means
of payment in acquisitions. The variable of interest is the proportion of cash used in
acquisitions by the FTSE 350 firms in our sample in fiscal year t + 1, which we can
compute only for firms in our sample that carry out at least one acquisition in that
year.
We use a Tobit model that controls for other variables to estimate the effects of
the pension plan variables on the means a payment. We use a set of controls similar
to the ones that we have previously used, including year and industry fixed effects.
The dependent variable, ci,t+1, is the proportion of cash used in the acquisitions
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completed by firm i in year t+ 1.
The results are show in Table 4. Interestingly, in Column 2 we find that firms
that sponsor a DB pension plan with a large deficit are more likely to use cash as a
means of payment in acquisitions. In Column 4, we show that the results are robust
to the exclusion of financial companies. However, as shown in columns 1 and 3 we
find no effect of the presence of DB pension plans by itself: what matters is the size
of the DB pension deficit relative to the firm’s market capitalization.
3.3 Announcement Effects
The literature on M&A activity in the presence of asymmetric information has pre-
dictions for announcement effects, in relation to the medium of exchange. In an
influential paper Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) solve a model in which
bidders have private information about their firms’ value, and in which they may
select a cash-security mix for their offer. This introduces a signalling role for cash.
They show that in equilibrium bidders will offer cash if their equity is relatively un-
dervalued. The higher the proportion of cash in the offer, the stronger is the signalling
effect, and the higher is the announcement effect. Therefore, their model predicts
a monotonic and increasing relationship between the percentage of cash in the offer
and the announcement effect.
In order to study announcement effects we collect from Datastream information
on daily closing stock prices for the firms in our sample. We calculate daily abnormal
returns as the difference between the daily return on the firm’s share price and the
daily return on the market (we use as a measure of the market the Footsie 350 index).
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each firm for two different
event windows. The first is three days, from day −1 to day +1, with 0 being the
announcement day. The second is five days, from day −2 to day +2 around the
announcement date. We merge the CARs data with the data on company sponsored
pension plans and other firm characteristics.
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In our setting the asymmetric information arises from the bidder’s sponsored DB
pension plans, assuming that bidders have better information on the pension plan
that they sponsor than outsiders do. The DB pension plan as a source of asymmetric
information is likely be more important the larger is its deficit relative to the market
value of the sponsor. The above theory predicts that cash should be associated with
a positive announcement effect, which should be stronger the more important the
pension plan as a source of asymmetric information. In order to test this hypothesis
we estimate the following regression, where the dependent variable is the CARjit for
acquirer i at time t over event window j (we estimate the regression for j = 3 and
j = 5):
CAR
j
it = α + βXit + γ(DB Dummy)it + θ1Cashit
+θ2Pensiondeficitit + θ3Pensiondeficitit × Cashit + ǫit (2)
where the vector Xit controls for firm characteristics (such as size, total leverage,
return on assets, and others) at the time of the acquisition (denoted by t), Cashit is
the proportion of cash used in the acquisition, and ǫit is the residual. The signalling
effects of cash should be particularly strong for acquisitions by firms that sponsor a
pension plan with a large deficit. For these firms asymmetric information concerns
are likely to be more important. Thus, the interaction term between Pension Deficit
and the proportion of cash used in the acquisition is the key regressor in our analysis.
The prediction of Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) is that its coefficient (θ3)
should be positive.
Some of the acquisitions carried out by the firms in our sample are fairly small,
for which one would not expect any announcement effect for the bidders. With
this in mind, we exclude from the analysis the observations corresponding to small
acquisitions (the bottom quarter, which corresponds to acquisitions smaller than
roughly £10 million pounds). This data restriction means that we have information
for 366 acquisitions that we use to estimate the above regression.
The results are reported in Table 5. We estimate a positive and statistically
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significant θ3, so that the announcement of a cash acquisition by a firm that sponsors
a DB pension plan with a large deficit is seen by the market as a positive signal. In
contrast, the announcement effect of a stock acquisition (the variable cash is equal
to zero) by firms that sponsor plans with a large pension deficit is negative and
statistically significant (as measured by the estimated value for θ2). This effect is
economically meaningful: for a firm with the average pension deficit of 5% a cash
acquisition is associated with a higher announcement return of 1.8% (= 5%× 0.353)
compared with a stock acquisition.
Table 5 also shows that these results are robust to considering a three or five day
window, and to the exclusion of acquisitions by financial firms from the sample (the
last two columns of Table 5). These results support the idea that indeed acquiring
firms use the medium of exchange to alleviate the asymmetric information problem
and facilitate the transaction.
We also study announcement effects for target companies in our sample, and the
impact of the sponsoring of a DB pension plan by these target companies. In this
case the source of asymmetric information is the target firm. The acquisition, and
the medium of exchange used, may still have a signalling role since the acquiring firm
may have better information about the target than other potential bidders, as in the
models of Hansen (1987) and Fishman (1989). For example, the bidder company may
have hired, prior to the announcement, pension consultants to gather information on
the pension plan of the target. In such a setting an offer with a large proportion of
cash may be used to signal a high valuation for the target, so as to preempt a potential
competing bidder. However, due to the fact that a large proportion of cash may lead
to a reduction in competition for the bidder, the target’s share price response to a
cash offer may vary. Fishman (1989) predicts a target share price increase (decrease)
if such an offer is accepted (rejected), while in Hansen (1987) the reverse is predicted.
We have estimated a regression similar to the one above for target firms. Table 6
shows the results. As one might expect, we find a positive and statistically significant
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θ1: the higher the proportion of cash used in the acquisition the larger the CARs.
However, neither the estimated coefficient on the pension deficit nor the estimated
coefficient on the interaction term are statistically different from zero. The reason
may be the positive signaling effect of cash is counteracted by the reduced competition
for the bidder that may result from the announcement of a cash offer. Alternatively,
the lack of statistical power may be due to the relatively small number of instances in
which a Footsie 350 company is acquired during the sample period (51 observations).
4 Further Tests
In this section we provide further evidence on the role of DB pension liabilities as a
source of information asymmetries. If our hypothesis that company sponsored pen-
sion plans act as a takeover deterrent because of information asymmetries, then such
asymmetries should also affect other corporate decisions. More precisely, information
asymmetries should affect firms that sponsor a DB pension plan ability to raise equity
through an SEO. We investigate whether that is the case in our data in section 4.1.
In section 4.2 we show that our main results to the inclusion of additional control
variables. In section 4.3 we consider alternative explanations.
4.1 Seasoned Equity Offerings
We obtain data on Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) from SDC platinum. The in-
formation we obtain includes the issuer, the issue date, the type of security (common
shares, convertibles, or other) and the amount issued. In the SEO data each obser-
vation corresponds to an offering. Furthermore, there are instances of firms making
more than one equity offering in the same fiscal year, albeit these different offerings
tend to be small in terms of amount issued. In those instances we have decided to
sum the amount of the different offerings. Since the fiscal year end differs across
firms, the balance sheet information and pension data for year t is matched with
information on the share offerings that take place in the 12 months that follow the
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fiscal year end.
We use the SEO data to construct four variables. The first variable is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the firm issues equity in fiscal year t+1 and zero
otherwise. That is, we will try explain equity issuance in fiscal year t + 1 based on
firm and pension plan information for the previous fiscal year end, i.e. t. The second
variable that we construct is the total amount of equity that the firm has issued
in the fiscal year. We construct analogous variables using the issuance of common
shares. More precisely, we construct a dummy variable that takes the value of one
if the company issued common shares during year t + 1 and zero otherwise, and a
variable that is the sum of the total amount of common shares issued. These two
variables exclude mainly the issuance of convertibles, which are an hybrid security.
We scale the total amount issued during the fiscal year variables by the beginning of
the year market value of the firm’s equity.
Table 7 shows summary statistics for the SEO variables. On average 8.72 percent
of the firm/years in our sample have issued some form of equity. The average is
slightly lower when we construct a dummy using the issuance of common shares.
The average unconditional total proceeds are 1.1 percent of the value of the equity,
but this value increases significantly, to 12.6 percent, when we condition the sample
on those that did issue equity. In addition, there is significant variation across firms
in terms of the amount issued, with some issuing an amount as high as 40 percent of
their market capitalization.
In order to study the effects of the sponsoring of DB pension plans on the firm’s
decision to issue equity we estimate the following probit model:
Si,t+1 =


0 if α + βXit + γ (DB Dummy)it + δ (Pension Deficit)it + εit ≤ 0
1 if α + βXit + γ (DB Dummy)it + δ (Pension Deficit)it + εit > 0
(3)
where Si,t+1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm decides to
issue equity in year t+1 and zero otherwise, Xit is a vector of control variables, and
εi,t+1 is the residual which is assumed to be N(0, 1).
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The results are reported in Table 8. As before, we report standard errors which
are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Columns 1 and 2
report the estimation results for the full sample, whereas columns 3 and 4 report
the estimation results when we exclude financial firms from the sample. For the
full sample, the existence of a company sponsored DB pension plan does not affect
the likelihood that equity is issued, but a large value of pension deficit relative to
the market capitalization of the firm makes it less likely that the firm issues equity.
This indicates that potential acquirers of firms with DB plans are worried when the
pension deficit is large compared with the firm’s equity, as shown in Column 2.
The results are stronger when we restrict the sample to non-financial firms (as
can be seen comparing Column 3 with Column 1). The sponsoring of a DB pension
plan reduces the likelihood that the firm issues equity. This effect is statistically
significant and economically meaningful: the probability of an equity issue is 4.23%
lower for firms that sponsor a DB pension plan than for firms that do not do so. In
Column 4, we include the pension deficit in addition to the dummy variable for the
sponsoring of a DB pension plan. These results show that likelihood of equity issues
is lower for firms whose pension plans have a large reported deficit, and that the
effects do not arise simply because of the company sponsoring a DB pension plan.
Some of the control variables are significant as well. More precisely, we find that
more leveraged firms are more likely to issue equity and more profitable firms, as
measured by ROA, are less likely to issue equity. The first result may be due to
the fact that SEOs are a way to reduce firm leverage; while the second finding is
due to the fact that profitable firms do not need to raise as much external capital
as less profitable ones. In the last two columns of Table 8 we report the estimation
results when the dependent dummy variable for equity issues was constructed using
the issuance of common shares only. These results confirm those in columns 1 and
2. There is little difference in the results as most firms issue common shares rather
than preferred shares.
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We also investigate the effects of the sponsoring of a DB pension plan on the total
amount raised through SEOs. For this purpose, we estimate a tobit model where the
dependent variable yi,t+1 is the total proceed from SEO issues by firm i in year t+ 1
and the independent variables are the same as in specification (3). The results are
shown in Table 9. The first four columns show the results for the total proceeds for
the full sample and for the sample excluding financial firms. The last two columns
report the results for the total proceeds of common share issues. The results in
terms of quantities mirror those for the decision to issue equity shown in Table 8.
For instance, for the sample of non-financial firms we find that firms that sponsor
a DB pension plan are less likely to raise large amounts through equity issues, a
result driven by those firms that have a large pension deficit relative to their market
capitalization.
Thus these results indicate that firms that sponsor DB pension plans, and in
particular those that sponsor pension plans with a large deficit, are less likely to
issue equity and to raise significant amounts of capital via SEOs. This result is
consistent with the view that DB pension plans represent a source of asymmetric
information for the sponsoring firms.
4.2 Additional Control Variables
In the main analysis we have controlled for firm size, profitability, cash holdings, and
total firm leverage. In this section we investigate the robustness of our results to the
inclusion of additional control variables that may affect the decision to issue equity
and/or M&A activity. Specifically, the decision to raise equity may be associated
with: (i) higher valuation (as proxied by the market to book ratio), as argued by
a large finance literature starting with Marsh (1982); (ii) lower debt capacity (as
proxied by lower asset tangibility, and profitability), as argued by the trade-off theory
(see Mackie-Mason, 1990); and (iii) asymmetric information due to other sources
than the DB pension plans (as proxied by higher stock return volatility, and lower
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ownership concentration), as argued by Mackie-Mason (1990) and Dierkens (1991).
Similarly, the likelihood of a takeover decreases with: (i) higher market to book
ratio, as argued by Servaes (1991); (ii) lower cash holdings, as argued by Jensen
(1986); and (iii) asymmetric information from sources other than DB pension plans
(as proxied by higher stock return volatility, and lower ownership concentration), as
argued by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007). The use of cash in acquisitions
may also be affected by asymmetric information problems unrelated to the sponsoring
of a DB pension plan.
In Table 10 we show the estimation results for five different specifications which
include these additional control variables. The dependent variables are: the SEO
dummy in Column 1; SEO Proceeds in Column 2; Takeover Chance dummy in Col-
umn 3; Completed Takeover dummy in Column 4; and proportion of Cash used in
acquisitions in Column 5. We estimate a probit model in columns 1, 3 and 4, and a
Tobit model in columns 2 and 5. The results on the effects of the pension variables
on equity issuance and M&A activity are robust to the inclusion of these control
variables.
The interpretation of the coefficients on the control variables is difficult as some of
the variables are likely to be highly correlated among themselves. The clear findings
are that firms with closely held shares are more likely to issue equity. This may be
because information asymmetries are less severe for firms with large shareholders.
Larger firms and firms with large stock return volatility are less likely to be acquired.
Taken together our results show that firms with large DB pension plans are less
likely to sell equity to investors. This happens in a variety of different situations,
namely in SEOs, as a target in M&A activity, and when choosing the means of pay-
ment in acquisitions of other firms. It is striking to see that the effects of the presence
of a company sponsored DB pension plan, in particular if it has a large deficit, are
consistent across all these different situations. Furthermore, and importantly, the
announcement of a cash acquisition by a bidder who sponsors a DB pension plan
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with a large deficit has a positive signal, reflective in the positive CAR associated
with the announcement.
4.3 Alternative Explanations
One possible explanation for the reason why companies with DB pension liabilities
may be less likely to be taken over and to issue shares is debt overhang (Myers, 1977).
According to this view, the presence of a large debt discourages shareholders from
investing in new project by raising funds that are junior to existing debt because
all benefits would be enjoyed by existing creditors. In all our regressions we control
for total leverage (which is the sum of financial leverage and the pension leverage).
Hence, our result cannot be due to debt overhang.
An alternative (and complementary) explanation for the reason why companies
with DB pension plans are less likely to be taken over is the possibility that trustees of
the pension plan demand that potential acquirers make significant cash contributions
to the plan. Trustees may be particularly concerned when the acquirer is financing
the acquisition with debt as it happens in Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs). In this case,
we would expect that private equity investors are less likely to complete successfully
a takeover of a firm with a DB pension plan, compared to firms without DB plans.
We have investigated whether this is the case.
In our sample, there are 28 firms that are targeted by private equity investors,
with 12 of these attempted takeovers being successful. We find that firms with DB
pension plans are equally likely to be targeted by a private equity investor than firms
without a DB plan. When we look at the probability that a successful takeover of a
firm with a DB pension plan, conditional on being attempted, we find no significant
difference between LBOs and other acquirers: the probability that LBO deals of
firms with DB pension plans are completed is 33%, while the probability that deals
by other acquirers are completed is 27%. Therefore, we do not find evidence in favor
of this alternative explanation.
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Another possible explanation is that firms which sponsor DB pension plans are
overvalued (as shown by Franzoni and Marin, 2006), acquirers know this and do not
bid for them. This explanation relies on an asymmetry between potential acquirers
and the market: while acquirers are aware of the overvaluation, the market does not
know about it and thus does not correct it. This explanation is consistent with our
results on M&A activity but is not supported by our findings on SEOs. Indeed, if the
market is not aware of the overvaluation, firms should have no difficulties in issuing
equity. In fact, one would expect them to take advantage of the overvaluation by
issuing even more equity. However, we find that firms with DB pension liabilities
are less likely to engage in SEOs, a result which is difficult to reconcile with an
overvaluation explanation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that defined-benefit corporate pension plans act as a
takeover deterrent. More precisely, UK firms that sponsor a DB pension plan are less
likely to be the target in an acquisition, and conditional on being targeted, the deal
is less likely to be completed. The effects that we have documented are statistically
significant and economically meaningful. They are robust to a variety of controls,
including a measure of leverage that treats the deficit in the pension plan as debt to
the sponsoring company.
Our proposed explanation is that firms that sponsor DB pension plans are subject
to greater informational asymmetry than similar firms that do not sponsor such
plans, and that this deters potential acquirers. The shortfall between the market
value of pension assets and the present value of the pension liabilities is a liability
for the sponsoring firm. Because of the complexity of evaluating pension liabilities,
the sponsoring firm’s managers are likely to enjoy and informational advantage with
respect to the market.
We have provided support for this explanation by studying announcement effects,
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in relation to the medium of exchange used by acquiring firms that sponsor a DB
pension plan. The information asymmetry hypothesis predicts that firms that are
subject to such sources of asymmetries are more likely to use cash when acquiring
other firms, since target shareholders will be more reluctant to accept the equity of
the acquiring firm. Furthermore, the announcement of a cash acquisition by a bidder
firm that is subject to information asymmetries should have a positive signalling
role, reflected in positive cumulative abnormal returns. Interestingly, we have found
this to be the case. Thus, our paper has provided evidence of the role played by
information asymmetries, arising from the sponsoring of DB pension plans, in M&A
activity, and of how the medium of exchange can be used as a signal and to facilitate
the transaction.
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Appendix
In this appendix we illustrate how longevity and employee mobility assumptions affect
the value of DB pension deficits. In the UK, the most widely used mortality tables for
the valuation of pension liabilities are those produced by the Continuous Mortality
Investigation Bureau (www.actuaries.org.uk), which were calculated using data on
pensioners, i.e. those drawing pension annuities from pension schemes insured with
life offices. Data on male and females is usually reported separately, and these tables
analyze both lives and amounts. For males this results in the so called PMA tables
(Pensioners Male Amounts). In order to produce these tables, mortality data is
analyzed in 4-year periods. And new tables are produced every 12 years or so. More
precisely, PMA80 which has base 1980 was produced by analyzing data from 1979 to
1982, PMA92 was produced with data from 1991 to 1994, and PMA00 was produced
using data from 1999 to 2002.
Figure 1 plots conditional death probabilities for PMA80, PMA92, and PMA00,
i.e. the probability that the individual will die between age t and t + 1 conditional
on being alive at age t. These tables assume that the individual will die at age 120
with probability one if he is still alive at that age. Figure 1 shows the improvements
in survival probabilities that have occurred over the last couple of decades, reflected
in the downward shift of the curve. In order to better illustrate what such different
mortality assumptions imply in terms of the present value of the pension deficits, we
have calculated the present value of an actuarially fair annuity that pays one pound
in real terms per year as long as the individual is alive, and zero otherwise. We have
calculated the value of such an annuity as of age 65, which is the typical retirement
age.
The present value of an annuity using PMA80 and a real discount rate of 1%
is 13.1 pounds. It increases to 15 pounds if one uses PMA92, and to 16.3 pounds
for PMA00. That is to say: the present value of such an annuity, and of pension
liabilities, is roughly 25% higher if one uses the most recent mortality tables instead
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of PMA80. Given that the average value of pension deficit, for the companies in our
sample that sponsor a DB pension plan, is roughly 200 million pounds, this means
that using PMA00 instead of PMA80 amounts to a difference of 50 million pounds
in pension liabilities.7
The value of the liabilities and of pension deficits also depends to a large extent
on the assumptions made regarding future improvements in life expectancy. Figure
1 also plots PMA92 (C=2010) which assumes improvements in life-expectancy until
2010. The actuarially fair price of an annuity calculated at age 65 using PMA92
(C= 2010) is 11.5% higher than if one uses PMA92 (assuming a real discount rate
of 1% and no real pension growth). This percentage difference becomes larger, equal
to 14%, if one considers instead the present value of a pound, paid every year to
an individual after he reaches age 65, and as long as he is alive, if the individual is
currently 50 years of age. This is because there are more years ahead for the future
assumed improvements in life expectancy to affect the present value of the annuity.
The pension deficit will also depend crucially on the assumptions made regarding
future job mobility. Consider for example the case of an individual who is 50 years old
and who has accumulated benefits equal to one real pound per year during retirement
(after 65). The present value of such annuity is 12.03 pounds, assuming a real discount
rate of 1% and using the PMA92 tables. That is, these calculations assume that there
is no future real growth in the retirement benefits already earned, as it typically is
the case for a deferred pension plan member, i.e. an individual who is entitled to
benefits but who is no longer contributing to the scheme (may be because he/she
no longer works for the company). If instead we assume that these annual pension
benefits will grow at a real rate of 1% until age 65, their present value is 13.97 pounds.
This will be the case for an individual who keeps on working for the company until
7As a curiosity, in 2008 British Airways reported that a one year increase in life expectancy
would have increased the deficit by £150 million in NAPS and £120 million in APS, or a total of
£270 million. This is to be contrasted with the market capitalization of BA which stood at roughly
£2 billion.
– 29 –
retirement age, and whose salary increases at the real rate of 1% per year. The
percentage difference in the values is equal to 16%. Thus, the assumptions made
regarding employee mobility have a large impact on the value of the pension deficit.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
This table shows summary statistics. Panel A lists the firm-level variables (from World-
scope): Return on Assets, which is equal to EBIT over total assets; Financial Leverage,
which is defined as short plus long term debt divided by total assets; Total leverage, which
is defined as short plus long term debt, plus the value of the pension deficit divided by total
assets; Cash Holdings, which is the value of cash holdings as a fraction of total assets; firm
size which is equal to the log of total assets; Market-to-Book ratio, which is the ratio of
market value of equity over book value of equity; Defined Benefit dummy, which takes value
1 if the firm sponsors a DB pension plan; Asset Tangibility, which is equal to the value
of PPE over total assets; Return Volatility is the volatility of the company’s stock return
over the previous year; and Closely Held shares is the proportion of the firm shares which
are closely held. Panel B lists DB pension plan data (from annual reports): Pension deficit
is scaled by total assets or by the market value of the equity of the sponsoring company.
Panel C reports the M&A variables (from SDC Platinum): Takeover Chance is a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if there was an attempted, completed takeover or rumors of a
possible takeover and 0 otherwise; Completed Takeover is a dummy variable takes value 1 if
there was a completed takeover and 0 otherwise; and Acquisition Cash is the proportion of
cash used in acquisitions, provided that at least one acquisition was announced in a given
year.
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Panel A: Firm variables
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max No Obs.
Return on Assets 0.0843 0.0782 0.0948 -0.2578 0.3766 1463
Financial Leverage 0.2442 0.2178 0.1867 0 0.9144 1463
Total Leverage 0.2721 0.2586 0.1933 -0.0519 0.9814 1463
Cash Holdings 0.0751 0.0438 0.0863 0 0.4176 1463
Firm Size 14.2674 14.0509 1.4636 11.5193 19.6562 1463
Market to Book Ratio 1.3822 1.1193 1.0991 0.024 6.3801 1463
Defined Benefit Dummy 0.6609 1 0.4735 0 1 1463
Asset Tangibility 0.299 0.1929 0.2887 0 0.9602 1375
Return Volatility (%) 28.1946 26.595 8.9562 13.23 56.45 1328
Closely Held Shares (%) 15.9185 11.165 18.3832 0.01 74.81 1449
Panel B: Pension plan variables
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max No Obs.
Pension deficit/total assets 0.0407 0.0194 0.0616 -0.0519 0.2821 967
Pension deficit/market cap 0.0512 0.021 0.0929 -0.1303 0.4901 967
Panel C: M&A activity variables
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max No Obs.
Takeover Chance 0.0917 0 0.2886 0 1 1463
Completed Takeover 0.0359 0 0.1861 0 1 1463
Acquisition Cash 0.4446 0.3371 0.4462 0 1 499
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Table 2: Univariate Tests
This table reports the means for several variables for firms with and without DB pension
plans, and t-tests on the differences between these means. The variables are presented
in Table 1: Return on Assets, Financial Leverage, Total Leverage, Cash Holdings, Firm
Size, Takeover Chance, Completed Takeover, and Acquisition Cash. The latter variable
is defined only if the firm announces at least one acquisition in a given year. Hence, the
number of observations reported refers to all variables but Acquisition Cash, for which the
total number of observations is 499 in Panel A, and 412 in Panel B.
Panel A: Complete sample.
With DB Pension Without DB T-test
Mean Mean p-value
ROA 0.0908 0.0629 0.000
Financial Leverage 0.2677 0.1991 0.000
Total Leverage 0.3084 0.1991 0.000
Cash Holdings 0.0685 0.0878 0.000
Firm Size 14.870 13.449 0.000
Takeover Chance 0.0939 0.0873 0.669
Completed Takeover 0.0261 0.0550 0.004
Acquisition Cash 0.440 0.467 0.693
Observations 967 496 1463
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Panel B: Financial Companies Excluded.
With DB Pension Without DB T-test
Mean Mean p-value
ROA 0.1001 0.0933 0.288
Financial Leverage 0.2706 0.2156 0.000
Total Leverage 0.3188 0.2156 0.000
Cash Holdings 0.0710 0.1211 0.000
Firm Size 14.564 13.229 0.000
Takeover Chance 0.0948 0.1418 0.029
Completed Takeover 0.0292 0.0945 0.000
Acquisition Cash 0.465 0.468 0.969
Observations 823 275 1098
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Table 3: Likelihood of a Takeover
This table presents estimations from probit regressions of M&A Activity on the DB Pension
dummy and the Pension Deficit scaled by market capitalization. Control variables are Firm
Size, Total Leverage, Cash Holdings, and ROA. The dependent variables are the Takeover
chance dummy in Columns 1 and 2; and the Completed takeover dummy in Columns 3 to
6. All variables are defined in Table 1. The whole sample is used in Columns 1-4; only
the firms/years with Takeover Chance = 1 are included in Columns 5 and 6. The standard
errors in brackets are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. *, **, ***,
indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Year and industry fixed effects
included (but their coefficients are not reported).
Panel A: Complete sample.
Dep variable: Takeover Chance Completed Takeover Completed Takeover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Size 0.0051 0.0048 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0693 -0.0667
[0.0058] [0.0058] [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0449] [0.0468]
Total Leverage -0.0317 -0.0177 -0.0006 0.0056 0.1243 0.2169
[0.0418] [0.0422] [0.0138] [0.0125] [0.2341] [0.2401]
Cash Holdings -0.0664 -0.0523 -0.0672*** -0.0552** -0.7604 -0.634
[0.0869] [0.0865] [0.0258] [0.0244] [0.6494] [0.6437]
ROA -0.135 -0.1550* -0.0379 -0.0405 -0.9247* -0.9502*
[0.0856] [0.0856] [0.0261] [0.0255] [0.4942] [0.4958]
DB Dummy -0.0135 -0.0055 -0.0193** -0.0112 -0.3615** -0.2858*
[0.0212] [0.0205] [0.0089] [0.0078] [0.1480] [0.1525]
Pension Deficit -0.1808* -0.1076** -2.1964*
[0.0937] [0.0464] [1.1327]
Sample: Full Full Full Full Takeover Chance = 1
Observations 1463 1463 1256 1256 125 125
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.095 0.158 0.173 0.306 0.332
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Panel B: Financial Companies excluded.
Dep variable: Takeover Chance Completed Takeover Completed Takeover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Size 0.0038 0.0034 -0.0039 -0.0038 -0.1153** -0.1152**
[0.0078] [0.0077] [0.0026] [0.0024] [0.0564] [0.0577]
Total leverage -0.0215 -0.0027 0.0097 0.0172 0.3159 0.4069
[0.0589] [0.0601] [0.0228] [0.0213] [0.2877] [0.3130]
Cash Holdings -0.2265** -0.2058* -0.1389*** -0.1159*** -0.9523 -0.8265
[0.1144] [0.1139] [0.0445] [0.0416] [0.8251] [0.8232]
ROA -0.2037* -0.2235** -0.0526 -0.0553 -0.9789* -0.9741*
[0.1044] [0.1045] [0.0405] [0.0379] [0.5457] [0.5462]
DB Dummy -0.0561* -0.043 -0.0430** -0.0276* -0.4450** -0.3863**
[0.0312] [0.0299] [0.0203] [0.0158] [0.1782] [0.1870]
Pension deficit -0.2047* -0.1357** -1.7221
[0.1137] [0.0545] [1.1840]
Sample: No Fin No Fin No Fin No Fin Takeover Chance = 1
Observations 1098 1098 942 942 107 107
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.092 0.154 0.165 0.329 0.344
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Table 4: Means of Payment in Acquisitions
This table presents estimations from tobit regressions of the proportion of cash used in
acquisitions. Control variables are Firm Size, Total Leverage, Cash Holdings, and ROA.
All variables are defined in Table 1. The dependent variable is Acquisition Cash, which
measures the proportion of cash used in acquisitions by a given firm in a given year. Only
the firms/years that announce an acquisition are included in the sample. Financial firms
are excluded from the regressions in Columns 3 and 4. The standard errors in brackets are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. *, **, ***, indicates significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Year and industry fixed effects included (but their
coefficients are not reported).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm size -0.1804*** -0.1639*** -0.2280*** -0.2112***
[0.0538] [0.0536] [0.0584] [0.0584]
Total leverage 0.0783 -0.1665 0.2016 -0.055
[0.3895] [0.4006] [0.4169] [0.4338]
Cash holdings 0.4223 0.2078 0.6947 0.5116
[0.8351] [0.8337] [0.8626] [0.8619]
ROA 1.4106* 1.6800** 1.6982** 1.9086**
[0.7965] [0.8026] [0.7986] [0.8048]
DB dummy 0.0592 -0.0736 0.1869 0.0786
[0.2088] [0.2142] [0.2216] [0.2264]
Pension deficit 2.2866** 1.8725**
[0.9224] [0.9126]
Sample: Full Full No Fin No Fin
Observations 471 471 412 412
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.048 0.048 0.053
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Table 5: Announcement Effects for Acquirors
This table presents estimations from OLS regressions of the cumulative abnormal returns
for the acquiring firm as a function of the cash used in acquisitions, the size of the deficit of
the defined-benefit pension plan of the acquiror and the interaction of these two variables.
Control variables are the Logarithm of Deal Value, Firm Size, Total Leverage, Cash Hold-
ings, ROA and DB dummy. In Columns 1 and 3 the dependent variable is CAR [−1,+1],
which is the cumulative abnormal return from day -1 to day +1 around the annoucement
date 0. In Columns 2 and 4 the dependent variable is CAR [−2,+2], which is the cumu-
lative abnormal return from day -2 to day +2 around the annoucement date 0. Only the
firms/years that announce an acquisition are included in the sample. Financial firms are
excluded from the regressions in Columns 3 and 4. The standard errors in brackets are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. *, **, ***, indicates significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Year and industry fixed effects are included (but their
coefficients are not reported.
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Dependent variable CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-2,+2]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash -0.007 -0.010 -0.011 -0.015
[0.014] [0.017] [0.015] [0.018]
Pension deficit -0.340** -0.391** -0.330** -0.416**
[0.136] [0.169] [0.154] [0.190]
Pension deficit x Cash 0.353** 0.408** 0.355** 0.433**
[0.145] [0.188] [0.164] [0.210]
Log(Deal Value) -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Firm size 0.004** 0.007** 0.006** 0.007**
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]
Total leverage 0.000 0.016 -0.005 0.022
[0.017] [0.019] [0.021] [0.023]
Cash holdings 0.068** 0.064* 0.080*** 0.080**
[0.029] [0.039] [0.029] [0.039]
ROA 0.039 0.065 0.034 0.070
[0.040] [0.047] [0.042] [0.049]
DB dummy 0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.000
[0.009] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012]
Sample: Full Full No Fin No Fin
Observations 366 366 329 329
R-squared 0.101 0.099 0.125 0.114
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Table 6: Announcement Effects for Targets
This table presents estimations from OLS regressions of the cumulative abnormal return
for the target firms as a function of the cash used in acquisitions, the size of the deficit of
the defined-benefit pension plan of the target and the interaction of these two variables.
Control variables are the Firm Size and DB dummy. In Columns 1 and 3 the dependent
variable is CAR [−1,+1], which is the cumulative abnormal return from day -1 to day
+1 around the annoucement date 0. In Columns 2 and 4 the dependent variable is CAR
[−2,+2], which is the cumulative abnormal return from day -2 to day +2 around the
annoucement date 0. Only the firms/years that announce an acquisition are included in
the sample. Financial firms are excluded from the regressions in Columns 3 and 4. The
standard errors in brackets are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. *,
**, ***, indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Dependent variable CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-2,+2]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash 0.120*** 0.101*** 0.131** 0.119**
[0.038] [0.034] [0.051] [0.046]
Pension deficit 1.513 0.617 1.429 0.854
[1.640] [1.647] [2.052] [1.746]
Pension deficit x Cash -1.550 -0.424 -1.545 -0.711
[1.625] [1.661] [1.934] [1.669]
Firm size 0.019 0.022 0.030 0.029
[0.013] [0.013] [0.022] [0.021]
DB dummy -0.010 -0.004 -0.030 -0.025
[0.054] [0.053] [0.061] [0.058]
Sample: Full Full No Fin No Fin
Observations 51 51 44 44
R-squared 0.114 0.128 0.150 0.166
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Table 7. Summary statistics: SEOs
This table shows summary statistics for SEO data (from SDC Platinum): SEO dummy
takes value 1 if the firm has issued any form of equity in year t and zero otherwise; SEO
Common Shares dummy takes value 1 if the company issued common shares during year
t and zero otherwise; SEO Total Proceeds is the total amount of equity that the firm has
issued in the same year as a fraction of the market capitalization at the beginning of the
year; SEO Common Shares Proceeds is the total amount issued in common shares scaled
by the market value of the firm’s equity.
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max No Obs.
SEO dummy 0.0872 0 0.2822 0 1 1463
SEO Common shares dummy 0.0853 0 0.2794 0 1 1463
SEO total proceeds 0.011 0 0.0519 0 0.4158 1463
SEO common shares proceeds 0.0104 0 0.0496 0 0.4037 1463
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Table 8: SEO Decision
This table presents estimations from probit regressions of SEO decisions on the DB Pension
dummy and the Pension Deficit (scaled by market capitalization). Control variables are
Firm Size, Total Leverage, Cash Holdings, and ROA. The dependent variable is SEO
dummy in Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4; and the SEO Common shares dummy in Columns 5
and 6. The variables are defined in Tables 1 and 4. The whole sample is used in Columns
1,2, 5 and 6; financial firms are excluded from the regressions in Columns 3 and 4. The
standard errors in brackets are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. *,
**, ***, indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Year and industry fixed
effects included (but their coefficients are not reported).
Dep variable: SEO Dummy SEO Dummy SEO Ord Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Size 0.0091 0.0091 0.0049 0.0049 0.0084 0.0084
[0.0057] [0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0062] [0.0056] [0.0057]
Total Leverage 0.0978** 0.1154*** 0.1023** 0.1240*** 0.1005*** 0.1165***
[0.0381] [0.0377] [0.0437] [0.0438] [0.0369] [0.0366]
Cash Holdings 0.1174 0.1378* -0.0009 0.0249 0.1176 0.1366*
[0.0807] [0.0766] [0.0902] [0.0872] [0.0789] [0.0751]
ROA -0.2232*** -0.2552*** -0.2620*** -0.2824*** -0.2203*** -0.2507***
[0.0842] [0.0850] [0.0802] [0.0816] [0.0815] [0.0826]
DB Dummy 0.0075 0.0165 -0.0423* -0.0281 0.0064 0.0148
[0.0209] [0.0205] [0.0287] [0.0289] [0.0205] [0.0201]
Pension Deficit -0.2615** -0.2009* -0.2413**
[0.1185] [0.1094] [0.1146]
Sample: Full Full No Fin No Fin Full Full
Observations 1463 1463 1098 1098 1463 1463
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.100 0.114 0.122 0.093 0.102
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Table 9: Proceeds from SEOs
This table presents estimations from tobit regressions of SEO decisions on the DB Pension
dummy and the Pension Deficit scaled by market capitalization. Control variables are Firm
Size, Total Leverage, Cash Holdings, and ROA. The dependent variables are SEO Total
Proceeds in Columns 1-4; and the SEO Common shares proceeds in Columns 5-6. The
variables are defined in Tables 1 and 4. The whole sample is used in Columns 1-2 and
5-6; financial firms are excluded from the regressions in Columns 3 and 4. The standard
errors in brackets are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. *, **, ***,
indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Year and industry fixed effects
included (but their coefficients are not reported).
Dep variable: SEO Total Proceeds SEO Total Proceeds SEO Ord Proceeds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Size 0.0092 0.0095 -0.004 -0.0036 0.0083 0.0086
[0.0114] [0.0114] [0.0142] [0.0141] [0.0112] [0.0112]
Total Leverage 0.2393*** 0.2849*** 0.2749*** 0.3349*** 0.2462*** 0.2883***
[0.0704] [0.0715] [0.0918] [0.0944] [0.0694] [0.0705]
Cash Holdings 0.2115 0.2655 -0.0383 0.0317 0.1983 0.2488
[0.1655] [0.1650] [0.1912] [0.1911] [0.1628] [0.1624]
ROA -0.5565*** -0.6392*** -0.6671*** -0.7278*** -0.5295*** -0.6075***
[0.1625] [0.1655] [0.1761] [0.1783] [0.1596] [0.1626]
DB Dummy 0.0204 0.0434 -0.0861* -0.0568 0.0179 0.0394
[0.0383] [0.0385] [0.0466] [0.0471] [0.0375] [0.0378]
Pension Deficit -0.6386*** -0.5326** -0.5942***
[0.2161] [0.2199] [0.2112]
Sample: Full Full No Fin No Fin Full Full
Observations 1463 1463 1098 1098 1463 1463
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.142 0.165 0.180 0.129 0.144
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Table 10: Robustness
This table presents regression estimates of the M&A Activity and the SEO decision on
the DB Pension dummy and the pension deficit. Control variables are Firm Size, Total
Leverage, Cash Holdings, ROA, Market to Book ratio, Tangibility (PPE over total assets),
Price volatility, and Closely Held shares. The dependent variables are the Takeover Chance
in 1, Completed Takeover in 2, and Acquisition Cash in Column 3, CAR3 in acquisitions in
Column 4, and the SEO dummy in Column 5. A probit model is estimated in Columns 1,
2 and 5; a Tobit model in Column 3; and OLS model in Column 4. The standard errors in
brackets are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. *, **, ***, indicates
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Year and industry fixed effects included
(but their coefficients are not reported).
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Dep variable: T. Chance Completed T. Acq. Cash CAR[-1,+1] SEO dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm Size 0.0054 -0.0032* -0.1701*** 0.0030 0.0063
[0.0059] [0.0017] [0.0592] [0.0026] [0.0049]
Total Leverage 0.0079 0.0090 -0.0490 0.0075 0.1356***
[0.0444] [0.0113] [0.5408] [0.0201] [0.0382]
Cash Holdings -0.1981** -0.0635** 0.6678 0.0400 -0.058
[0.0970] [0.0262] [0.9952] [0.0288] [0.0822]
ROA -0.2007* -0.0775** 2.0211 0.0447 -0.0819
[0.1092] [0.0329] [1.3007] [0.0449] [0.0932]
Market to Book -0.0112 -0.0011 -0.0547 -0.0044 -0.0115
[0.0082] [0.0021] [0.0940] [0.0033] [0.0075]
Asset tangibility -0.0159 -0.0048 -0.1438 0.0033 -0.0193
[0.0281] [0.0061] [0.3085] [0.0082] [0.0239]
Price volatility 0.0002 -0.0005** -0.0071 -0.0001 0.0011
[0.0010] [0.0003] [0.0093] [0.0003] [0.0008]
Closely held sh -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0022 -0.0000 0.0008**
[0.0004] [0.0001] [0.0043] [0.0001] [0.0004]
DB dummy -0.0323 -0.0086 0.0230 0.0030 0.0126
[0.0238] [0.0069] [0.2375] [0.0100] [0.0175]
Pension deficit -0.2079** -0.0996** 2.6230** -0.3159** -0.1713*
[0.0985] [0.0394] [1.1175] [0.1315] [0.0985]
Cash -0.0033
[0.0155]
Pension deficit x Cash 0.3372**
[0.1440]
Estimation method Probit Probit Tobit OLS Probit
Observations 1236 1047 426 331 1236
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.222 0.048 0.129 0.115
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Figure 1: Importance of Mortality Assumptions. The figure plots the conditional death probabilities for different sets
of mortality assumptions. PMA80 reflects the mortality probabilities calculated using data for 1979-1982, PMA92 does the
same for 1991-1994 data, and PMA00 for 1999-2002 data. PMA92 (C=2010) is based on the PMA92 data but it assumes
improvements in life-expectancy up to 2010.
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